



Hudson, David; Marquette, Heather
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Hudson, D & Marquette, H 2015, Mind the gaps: What’s missing in political economy analysis and why it
matters. in A Whaites, E Gonzalez, S Fyson & G Teskey (eds), A Governance Practitioner’s Notebook:
Alternative ideas and approaches. OECD, Paris.
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
© OECD 2015
Published in A Governance Practitioner's Notebook: Alternative Ideas and Approaches on 01/11/2015
http://www.oecd.org/dac/accountable-effective-institutions/governance-practitioners-notebook.htm
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
A GOVERNANCE PRACTITIONER’S NOTEBOOK: ALTERNATIVE IDEAS AND APPROACHES © OECD 2015 67
 mIND THE GAPS: WHAT’S mISSING  IN POLITICAL ECONOmY ANALYSIS AND WHY IT mATTERS
Mind the gaps: What’s missing  
in political economy analysis and why it matters
David Hudson and Heather Marquette1
Why, despite over a decade of sustained and high quality political economy 
analysis, does it seem that we aren’t getting any closer to politically informed 
programming being the norm rather than the (notable) exception? most 
donor staff, regardless of sector or specialism, seem to accept the importance 
of thinking and working politically, with some buy-in at the top (though this 
may be limited, in reality, to the small “p” of delivering aid projects rather 
than the big “P” of understanding and working with power relationships 
and structures). A flurry of political economy analysis (PEA) tools over the 
last ten years has been backed by interesting and engaging PEA training.  
Yet uptake and impact – both achieving and demonstrating impact – are 
proving challenging. In this article we argue that there are four key reasons, 
or gaps, that undercut the practical impact of PEA; in ascending order 
of importance they are: 1)  conceptual, 2)  operational, 3)  evidential, and 
4) organisational.
First, there are serious conceptual gaps within PEA tools and studies. more 
specifically, most PEA tools seriously underplay the role of ideas and the 
complexity of power. In our view this is the least important of the four gaps 
in explaining the limited impact of politically informed programming, but it 
is worth noting, and we’ll explain why.
Second, there is a gap between PEA and frontline working, programming 
and implementing. For too many staff PEA is something that is done by 
outside specialists and exists in long and detailed analytical documents; it is 
not a living and breathing process woven into everyday practice. Analysis is 
rarely linked into strategy and is not always aimed at the right level.
Third, despite lots and lots of evidence that ignoring politics can be 
disastrous for aid effectiveness, if we’re really honest, we don’t have a 
very good evidence base for what works, when and why. This matters for 
good programme design as much as anything else. Understanding how and 
which bits of thinking and working politically are necessary and sufficient 
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conditions for success is crucial. Is it design, analysis, reporting requirements, 
the theory of change, how programmes are staffed or trained, the enabling 
environment, time frames, size, resources, a particular mindset, high level 
support, cover or leadership and so on? We have some pointers, but no 
systematic tests of these.
Fourth, there is a gap between individuals’ desires to design and implement 
politically informed programmes and the support and opportunities that their 
organisation provides. Conflicting institutional logic such as the imperative 
to spend, organisational silos, the results-based agenda, political and 
taxpayer intolerance of failure, and so forth, make it extremely difficult to do 
development differently in any straightforward sense. We need to take these 
organisational challenges more seriously and not simply exhort colleagues to 
work politically. This last challenge is the most serious but, if we can get around 
it, represents a seriously big win for a “thinking and working politically” agenda.
1. Conceptual gaps: the idea of politics and the politics of ideas
most PEA is commissioned as an add-on activity, and there’s little 
evidence that it’s changing the way staff think. This is a shame, because 
when PEA was first conceived it was seen much more as a process whereby 
staff learned a new way to think about the ways in which politics affected 
their work (or how their work affected local politics) (Bjuremalm, 2006; Fisher 
and marquette, 2014. It was intended as a “revolution”, a reversal of the 
increasingly naive, apolitical approach to development programming that 
started with the ascendancy of economics in the early 1980s (Carothers and 
de Gramont, 2013; marquette, 2003).
PEA involves plenty of economics, but not much in the way of politics. 
Ben Fine has argued that economics “has long sought to colonise the other 
social sciences on the basis of its method by universalising what Gary Becker 
and his followers call ‘the economic approach’ to any area of non-economic 
life” (Fine, 1999). PEA itself has become increasingly apolitical, choosing to 
work with the language of economics more than the language of politics. 
Hudson and Leftwich (2014) find that most PEA relies too much on economic 
assumptions and is really the “economics of politics”, not political economy 
at all. Of course there is a politics to this, given that economists tend to be 
the most respected and influential cadres in most development agencies. 
Nevertheless, there are consequences to adopting the language of economics. 
Economistic PEA overlooks the real political action – the negotiations, deals, 
coalition building, battles over ideas and the operation of power.
For example, the focus on incentives is useful, but only up to a point. PEA 
tends to view incentives such as wealth and power as universal motivators, 
whereas in fact multiple incentives and the formal and informal “rules of the 
game” overlap. This means that if we change the incentives, we’re unlikely 
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to get uniform or predictable results. Individuals do not bend simultaneously 
and uniformly like reeds in the water when the wind changes direction 
(Hudson and Leftwich, 2014).
PEA tends to make tidy analytical distinctions between interests, 
incentives and institutions. In real life it’s far more complex. When a politician 
seeks election is it because it’s in their interest? Or is there is an incentive 
to stand for election because of the opportunities once in political office to 
increase a politician’s interests of wealth and power? These are questions of 
political analysis, the type of question that PEA frequently misses.
Politics is the battle of ideas, but ideas are often missing from PEA. Ideas 
include collectively held beliefs that shape the social world, such as religion 
or political ideologies. They can be normative ideas about what is right and 
wrong – such as opinions on same-sex marriage – or beliefs about how the 
world works. Ideas are more than “informal institutions” such as norms, 
beliefs and values. They matter to formal institutions, such as constitutions. 
To relegate ideas to the “soft” end of politics would be a mistake. Joseph 
Stalin – hardly someone to adopt academic affectations – understood this 
well when he said: “Ideas are more powerful than guns. We would not let our 
enemies have guns, why should we let them have ideas?” Paying attention 
to ideas is part and parcel of being a political realist. Taking ideas more 
seriously also helps to explain why actors often act against their own obvious 
economic self-interest. Actors are not always driven by greed, and they are 
not “actors”. They are people, with all the messy complexity that implies.
Crucially, ideas motivate and guide interests. They shape how problems 
are understood, and underpin legitimate forms of rule and systems of 
accountability. Ideas help form coalitions around a collective interest. They 
can help frame interests and incentives to bring about transformative 
change. Ideas are contested – even ones that are considered to be doctrine. 
For example, in the struggle to pass the Reproductive Health Law in the 
Philippines that made contraception more widely available, 159 prominent 
Catholic academics spoke out in its favour. They argued that a true Catholic, 
part of the Church of the Poor, would support any bill designed to alleviate 
the suffering and poverty of women and children (Ateneo Professors, 2008).
Political leaders are often driven by their experience and their ideas. 
Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah was strongly influenced by Pan-Africanist ideas, 
Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere by a belief in what he called ujamaa (“unity” 
or “familyhood”), Senegal’s Léopold Senghor by “African socialism” and 
Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew by a mix of social-democratic beliefs and “soft 
authoritarianism” that is often summed up as “Asian values”. The same goes 
for all individuals and organisations at all levels of politics (Hudson and 
Leftwich, 2014). Understanding elite attitudes towards poverty in malawi 
can help to explain why there’s little support for cash transfers, despite clear 
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evidence that they are effective in alleviating poverty. Future cash transfer 
programmes that take this into account could lead to better buy-in and more 
sustainable programmes by linking cash transfers to concepts malawi’s 
elite do approve of, such as public works programmes or education (Kalebe-
Nyamongo and marquette, 2014).
And – very practically – understanding what motivates people opens up 
political opportunities to work politically. It widens the spectrum of what’s 
politically possible. In Jordan, for example, a coalition that successfully 
campaigned for a new law against domestic violence framed the issue as 
protecting the whole family. To reduce political opposition, the campaign did 
not focus on women’s rights, but argued that the new law would also protect 
children and the elderly (Tadros, 2011: pp. 22-23). Seeing what is politically 
possible – not just feasible – makes the opportunities to work politically more 
visible. And, we hope, makes politics less scary and more recognisable.
This isn’t just an academic discussion about language, discourse etc.; 
it’s about an ongoing fear of politics in development agencies and a fear of 
not being seen as relevant to economists who continue to dominate many 
development agencies (though not all). Talking about “political economy 
analysis” rather than “political analysis” matters, just as trying to find 
another way to say “thinking and working politically” does. Hiding politics 
behind apolitical language, and taking politics out of PEA, means we’ll never 
get to grips with politics. So much for the revolution.
In our ideal world, we would stop talking about PEA, which is in many 
ways an increasingly discredited “brand”, and we would talk instead about 
political analysis (Hudson and Leftwich, 2014). There are many, many ways 
to think about politics beyond the current framing of PEA. This may end up 
with a messier analytical landscape, but messy isn’t necessarily a bad thing. 
It could open up more space for country specialisms and local knowledge, 
framed the way local actors want to frame analysis, not the way that PEA 
specialists believe it should be framed. Local voices drawing on feminist 
theory or marxist theory or behaviouralist theory, or whichever theories 
for political analysis help them to understand their world and explain it to 
external actors, not the other way around. Now that would be revolutionary.
2. Operational gaps: the frontline challenge of thinking politically
The next gap is one of practicality. There is too wide a gap between the 
analysis PEA produces and frontline working. Can we include politics, power 
and ideas in PEA without creating ever-more complex frameworks that are 
too time-consuming to be useful? How can we get political analysis into our 
strategies? Do we even have strategies for thinking and working politically?
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most PEA frameworks and training are written by governance people 
for governance people. They often lack a language that non-governance 
staff can relate to (What are “institutions”? How about “open access orders”? 
“PDIA”, anyone?). Sometimes the same words are used to describe very 
different things. We have found this with our research on higher education 
and developmental leadership. “Institutions”, to higher education specialists, 
mean higher education institutions, such as universities and colleges. So 
when we collaborate on research, we – the governance/politics specialists – 
need to find different language to explain what we mean (and not the other 
way around).
more fundamentally, donor staff are pressed for time, and PEA 
frameworks are often complex. This has led to a heavy reliance on external 
consultants – who may have helped design those complicated frameworks 
in the first place (Fisher and marquette, 2014). Training courses sensitise 
staff, but don’t necessarily create the incentives, time or skills to do political 
analysis in-house. After all, we have seen plenty of governance specialists 
who know the language but don’t really “think politically”.
As Duncan and Williams (2012) point out, PEA has often become a 
“dismal science of constraints”. PEA studies tend to focus on risks and the 
limited scope for donor engagement rather than on possibilities. That’s not 
helpful for staff who want to minimise risk and spend funds,2 and, it has to 
be said, this can create incentives for consultants to “massage” findings into 
something more appealing. This could be damaging, particularly where staff 
depend on PEA consultants as “translators” of what local people really want. 
None of this is likely to bring about behavioural change among donor staff. 
“Thinking politically” needs to be internalised to be effective, and reliance on 
consultants is hardly “flexible” or “adaptive”.
Having said this, there will always be the need for “big” political 
analysis: when a new country director or manager comes in and needs to 
understand the lie of the land, when a country strategy needs to be drawn 
up or when there’s a change of government or outbreak of violence or some 
other critical juncture. And there’s likely to always be need for some sort 
of “problem-driven” political analysis, when projects and programmes hit 
a wall, and staff know that there may be a political issue at play that they 
don’t quite understand. But what about the everyday working – checking 
the political temperature, so to speak? Something that can be done by 
anyone, at their desk or in conversations with partners and colleagues. We 
are missing a frontline, everyday political analysis tool that sets out a small 
number of questions in a way that drops governance jargon of interests, 
incentives, institutions and so forth. The sorts of relatively straightforward 
questions that try to cut to the heart of what politics means and how it can 
affect development programmes at the micro-, as well as the meso- and 
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macro-levels. We are working on an Everyday Political Analysis (EPA) tool 
that we hope fills this gap, but would welcome efforts to do this from others.
Of course, there’s a risk that even an “everyday” political analysis tool 
could become yet another tick-box exercise, as PEA has all too often become. 
Craig Valters has written about theories of change (ToC) recently, finding that 
ToC approaches can create space for critical reflection and learning, but that 
this can also be “an illusory process” (Valters, 2014: p. 18). We have all seen 
theories of change that are clearly based on fantasy, a box-ticking exercise to 
secure funding rather than an exercise grounded in solid analysis, learning 
and communication. Valters quotes a participant in a ToC workshop as 
saying, “Like any tool, Theories of Change can be good or bad, useful or not; 
it needs to be used critically” (Valters, 2014: p. 15).
The same goes for political analysis at any level. Political analysis 
should be about interpreting and understanding the political context of that 
country/region/municipality, but it should be a critical process. In many fragile 
contexts, in particular, a great deal of informal everyday political analysis 
already goes on, because formal PEA studies are time-consuming and 
costly. But how much of this “analysis” is based on a systematic process of 
validation and learning? How much of it goes through an internal challenge 
function and feeds into learning strategies? Whatever level we’re talking 
about, seeing political analysis as a process whereby programme actors are 
given space to debate and challenge interpretations of what’s going on on the 
ground, is vital. This should, in the end, make programming easier and more 
effective, and it should lead to a change in learning culture and to better 
strategies.
At the end of the day, political analysis needs to feed into strategy in 
order to be worthwhile. This could be high-level strategy, such as 5-year 
country strategies, but it could also be “low-level” strategy. A theory of 
change with realistic and well-informed assumptions. An approach to 
monitoring and evaluation that allows for adaptation and learning. A 
strategy, after all, is just a fancy way of saying, “we have an action plan”. We 
know what the overall aims and goals are, and we have a plan for achieving 
that. The strategy should be flexible and adaptive, and a good process of 
political analysis, at the right level, should be a fundamental input in the 
development of realistic and achievable plans. The opportunities for strategy 
formulation and adjustment may, in reality, be quite rare, and programme 
managers will often inherit strategies from their predecessors or a design 
team, and so may have limited opportunities for massive adjustment. 
But a regularised process of critical reflection through political analysis 
could provide a way to (re)shape strategies and even, if necessary, shame 
poorly designed projects.3 Getting this right is where its greatest (untapped) 
potential lies.
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3. Evidential gaps: do we know if PEA really works?
Is most PEA robust enough to justify the way it’s used? Does it lead to 
improved results? Does it create its own unintended consequences? We 
just don’t know. Common sense tells us that high-quality, relevant, useful 
political analysis must be essential for getting better results from our aid, but 
we don’t yet have proof. No wonder uptake is difficult; we’ve not yet proven 
the case.
What we do have are a few interesting compilations of cases where PEA 
has been used to good effect – see the excellent collections from Verena 
Fritz and colleagues (2014) and David Booth and Sue Unsworth’s eloquent 
paper on “politically smart, locally led” aid (2014). There are widely cited 
cases where political analysis has been at the heart of a politically informed 
programme design – such as the Coalitions for Change programme funded by 
the Australian Aid Program and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) in the Philippines or the State, Accountability and Voice 
Initiative (SAVI) funded by the Department for International Development 
(DFID) in Nigeria (Sidel, 2014; Booth, 2014; Derbyshire and mwamba, 2013). 
These are great efforts that make for very interesting reading, but selective, 
single country case studies written up by programme actors themselves 
don’t constitute an evidence base. There have been no independent large 
evaluations of PEA itself, either within donor agencies or across them.
We need an evidence base. Proponents of working politically, doing 
development differently and so on call on donors to dramatically change 
the way they work: end the imperative to spend, get rid of log frames, work 
more flexibly and adaptively (even if it means not having a measurable – and 
thus, accountable – plan). But these are “big P” political challenges that are 
extremely unlikely to change, certainly not without the sort of compelling 
evidence base that could convince heads of development agencies, and in the 
case of bilaterals, their parliaments and their public, to exclude aid agencies 
from the rules that govern the rest of the civil service. Those of us in this 
thinking and working politically “space” make a lot of claims and demand a 
lot of changes without knowing for sure that we’re right, or even that we’re 
right in the right way.
We need a systematic comparative analysis of PEA and different kinds of 
politically informed programmes, where the case selection is clearly specified 
and justified. There needs to be variation in outcomes from success to failure. 
We won’t learn much (or convince many) by just cherry picking successful 
cases. We need a rigorous evidence base, rather than self-referential narrative 
case studies. For sure, stories, anecdotes and vignettes convince some people 
and even key people at key times; they are compelling, relatable and, above 
all, memorable. We need these stories, but they are worthless without a solid 
evidence base behind them.4 There are many possible ways to do this, of 
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course, including as a minimal first step, expecting case studies – whether 
written up by project/programme actors or others – to discuss their case-
selection criteria, to make clear their approach to analysis and to be honest 
about limitations and any caveats that their study raises.
And finally, we need to understand the mechanisms better. What is it 
about a particular programme that makes it successful? Disaggregating such 
processes requires either in-depth longitudinal or comparative analysis, or 
both in order to rule different factors in or out. most likely we will find that 
it is different combinations of factors that matter, and so if one ingredient is 
missing overall effectiveness is undercut. moreover, it is likely that certain 
ingredients only work in a particular environment – whether that is because 
of cultural norms, power structures or the viability of the state – and so what 
works here, doesn’t necessarily work there (Cartwright, 2012). Too narrow 
an evidence base will miss these different combinations and variations 
in success and failure. This is not just about convincing others about the 
importance of thinking and working politically, it is about us being able to 
design and implement politically informed programmes more successfully.
measuring politics and governance is hard. When it comes to the types 
of activities and progress that are aimed at (politically) transformative 
change, these aren’t easily monitored or evaluated. It’s not simply a case 
of counting the number of people inoculated, or girls attending school, or 
embankments and sluice gates built. Building coalitions, successful advocacy, 
civic strengthening, winning hearts and minds, power, and legitimacy are all 
difficult to quantify, as with any fluid and social things.
A further problem is that alternative institutional measures – that track 
more formal governance changes – are very slow-moving and long-term 
processes. There will very rarely be any meaningful change in a three or 
five-year period (Fukuyama, 2011). For example, the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGIs) time-series data shows a relatively static 
picture since 1996 with the global averages showing no clear pattern of 
systematic improvements or declines (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Typically, the 
most that can be seen is that over a decade or so around 8% of countries show 
a significant improvement or decline.
But not all “politically informed programmes” will be about this sort of 
transformative change. Some will be much more typical aid programmes, 
just done in a way that is more politically savvy and well informed. A 
colleague in the Thinking and Working Politically Community of Practice 
has talked about this in terms of a spectrum:5 at one end there is the 
“evolutionary uptake” where traditional, often large, programmes remain 
chiefly technical, but are informed by analysis in order to lead to greater 
political awareness. At the other end, where there is “revolutionary uptake”, 
reform coalitions are mobilised and programmes use highly flexible models 
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in order to respond to political opportunities where they arise in order to 
bring about largely political and social change. Different aims, different 
programme designs and different political analysis needs; our conversations 
about political analysis need to better reflect these, and our evidence base 
needs to help us to do this with more credibility at whichever end of the 
spectrum we’re talking about.
4. Operational gaps: getting real about the things we can do something 
about
We all talk about how the bureaucratic procedures within aid agencies – 
be they donors or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – need to change 
and how these limit the effectiveness and uptake of PEA. There’s already 
excellent research on this (e.g. Carothers and de Gramont, 2013; Yanguas and 
Hulme, 2014; Hout, 2012). Staff face organisational incentives and barriers 
that affect their ability and willingness to engage meaningfully with political 
analysis. Their careers are made or broken on their track record of spending 
money, often regardless of whether or not outcomes have been achieved, 
whether they like it or not. They are already pushed to their limits in terms 
of time pressures (as in any industry nowadays) and can rarely work with 
analysis in anything other than a shallow way. In an era of austerity and 
tightening budgets for donors and charities alike, they’re unlikely to get more 
staff to relieve this pressure. They’re already under pressure to spend money/
raise money, get value for money, be more open and transparent and so on, 
not all of which makes uptake of PEA any easier.
At a recent World Bank event in London, staff from different development 
agencies admitted that the best, most useful political analysis they’ve used 
has been informal rather than formal: conversations with taxi drivers, 
opposition politicians, journalists, their peers in country. They don’t (or can’t) 
write this down, though, and it gets incorporated into country strategies 
only in annexes, if at all. It stays in their heads and moves on with them 
when they inevitably move to a different country. In a current study that 
the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) and 
the Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) are undertaking for a donor 
on the use of evidence in programming on political settlements in fragile 
environments, the most useful source of information for programming 
actors working in very difficult environments seems to be very short reports, 
mainly by email, from local analysts. “Informal political analysis” may be the 
living, breathing manifestation of truly thinking and working politically, but 
in an era where there are few country specialists and no one sticks around 
in one place for more than two or three years, it makes it very hard to not 
keep reinventing the wheel. It also makes validation of material difficult and 
doesn’t necessarily feed into internal processes or strategy, particularly if 
there’s no structure in place to manage the analysis coming in.
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Donor procedures make “working politically” difficult, thanks to 
inflexible ways of working (Andrews, 2013). Log frames are believed to lock 
in projects and programmes at an early stage in the process, regardless of 
what may happen politically speaking along the way (Powers, 2014). We often 
talk about how “mavericks” are able to think and work politically by ignoring 
official ways of working or finding ways around the system. If they can’t do 
this, then they can work with local “development entrepreneurs” who can do 
the flexible, adaptive work for them (Faustino, 2012).
But we can’t always programme around mavericks, who are the exception 
and not the norm, and not everyone can or should be an “entrepreneur”. 
Thinking and working politically can mean designing development 
programmes that are politically radical and perpetually fluid, but it doesn’t 
have to be. At its heart, it’s about programming that is sensibly designed.
Imagine now we have better political analysis that covers all the levels 
it needs to and feeds into strategy, we’re incorporating it better in frontline 
activities, and we have an evidence base that proves it’s important. Will 
this change development agencies’ working practices? most aid projects and 
programmes still aren’t designed in a way that puts politics at the forefront. 
We seem to be stuck at what Carothers and de Gramont call the “almost 
revolution”. This is not about having the tools or commitment to work 
politically, but rather it’s about making the ways we work fit for purpose. To 
be able to think and work politically, we need to be able to strategise, to build 
relationships and to risk experimenting with more flexible and adaptive 
politically-informed approaches. Sadly, staff rarely have tangible incentives, 
resources or the support to change the way they work.
But this may not be about the levels that we’ve already talked about: 
getting rid of incentives to spend, changing the norm of three-year postings 
and so on. Even with the best evidence base in the world, changing these 
involves making a case to treat development agencies differently to any other 
government department, to take their staff out of civil service structures, and – 
let’s be honest – to make them less politically accountable to their parliaments 
and the public. Let’s be honest again – this is never going to happen. It could 
happen in philanthropic organisations, could possibly happen at the World 
Bank, and it could happen in NGOs, but it is almost certainly not going to 
happen for bilateral agencies. We need to be much more realistic about this.
However, there are things that we can change that will probably make 
a big difference that come to light when we stop looking only at the “big P” 
bureaucratic blockages. Everyday working practices in donor agencies need 
to change in order to really think and work politically, and many of these are 
fairly straightforward. It’s about seeing the possible in existing bureaucratic 
arrangements; after all, even log frames have plenty of room for manoeuvre 
depending on how they are designed.
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There are countless small, but serious, everyday barriers to thinking and 
working politically and designing more politically informed programming. 
For example, if a “politically informed” health programme is to be put in place 
it could fruitfully be done by joining up health and governance teams in order 
to co-design the programme, provided of course that each team includes 
(senior) staff who “get it”. This is more challenging than it sounds though, 
but not for the reasons we often read about in the literature. Instead it’s 
because aligning schedules between the health and governance teams can 
take weeks, as different teams will tend to operate on different timetables; 
the language and assumptions that inform different teams need to be made 
explicit to move towards a shared understanding of the issue and this takes 
time; different teams or units have their own (multiple) objectives and 
interests, and these need to be brokered (Lancaster, 2007; Allison, 1971).6 To 
collaborate effectively we need to take on board how development agency 
staff actually work.
These sound like superficially mundane issues, but they’re not. Joining 
up policy and implementation is an administrative not an analytical barrier 
(Ling, 2002). These aren’t just pesky bits of sand in the wheels; they are 
boulders. They fundamentally arise because of the way that development 
agencies are set up, but the solution is not to throw away the rulebook or 
tear down silo (and indeed specialist!) walls willy-nilly. Instead it points to 
the need to think about who can act as internal brokers, the people within 
the organisation who are willing and able to bring different teams together. 
People in different teams who are interested in, and committed to, working 
differently; who can see the internal room for manoeuvre; who have the 
seniority and the reputation that allows them space to innovate and to 
carry the rest of the team along, sceptics and all; and who are interested in 
collaboration outside their own team, even if it means sharing both the glory 
of success and the pain of failure.
We recently spoke to one country team in Asia doing some exciting work 
on bringing politics into sector programming. They have a relatively new (but 
very experienced) team leader who has worked to create a coherent strategy 
across the entire sector programme. Team members explained that this 
brought all programme leads together on a regular basis, rather than them 
all managing discrete and disparate programmes. This created both the 
space and the opportunity to think and work politically, and it made political 
challenges (and opportunities) more visible. A relatively small change paying 
out potentially huge dividends, even before we take “thinking and working 
politically” into account. It’s not just good aid practice; it’s good business 
practice.
Senior management in country offices could free up time in their weekly 
or biweekly meetings to discuss issues emerging from political analysis. 
Governance staff could be embedded in sector teams – and vice versa, building 
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relationships, sharing challenges and expertise. Co-design of programmes 
could be incentivised. It is a mistake to overlook these issues in favour of the 
“big P” issues. making such changes needs high-level support and leadership, 
but only at the country office level, not at the prime minister level. Worth a try 
first? Would these things help to make the “big P” challenges less challenging? 
If we can get sector teams thinking more strategically, creating space for 
conversations, questioning, innovation, relationship building and support, 
maybe when teams need to get money out the door, or individuals move on 
after a couple of years, the costs won’t be as high.
5. Conclusions: organising the “revolution”?
PEA has often been about trying to fit staff into the tools that we design, as 
opposed to designing tools that fit the way staff actually work. Imagine staff 
are politically savvy. Imagine they have a deep understanding of the contexts 
in which they work. Imagine they know what an “institution” is. Imagine they 
love being flexible and adaptive and don’t enjoy a clear roadmap and rules. 
Imagine they have the freedom to learn from failure and that this failure 
won’t end up splashed all over the media or in being asked tricky questions by 
parliament. PEA needs to fit the way staff actually work, not the way analysts 
would love them to work. The thinking and working politically “agenda” needs 
to start from where we are, not an imaginary world where we all have a can 
opener.7 Getting discussions closer to the ground – to practitioners and local 
actors – may help here, though this isn’t a panacea. These folks need to buy in 
to the need for “thinking and working politically” too.
Our overall message is that it is everyday, practical issues that make 
uptake of PEA/political analysis and the overarching “thinking and working 
politically” agenda difficult. While no one explicitly argues that getting the 
analysis right is a silver bullet, until we are clear that getting it right is but one 
among a whole series of necessary steps to improve development outcomes, 
we will be encumbered by an implicit silver bullet-ism. However, this is not a 
counsel of despair nor an argument against better and more political analysis 
leading to more politically informed programming. On the contrary, we think 
that serious, committed and careful political analysis is a must. At the same 
time let’s get serious about what it can do, if done well, but also what it can’t 
and won’t change. And we need the evidence base to prove this.
In our ideal world, in ten years’ time it would be great if we could not 
get away with designing programmes without having a politics lens, just as 
ignoring poverty, welfare, environmental sustainability or gender is not ok 
now. It’s important to remember that these were all battles in the past that 
were eventually won. As long as we keep the politics in PEA, it is possible to 
win this battle too, but only if we’re more realistic about the end goal and 
how to achieve it.
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How can we start prioritising in order to take this agenda forward? We 
suggest:
1. Conceptual:
- Stop trying to fit “politics” into one analytical framework/approach. 
There are lots of ways to analyse politics beyond institutionalism, 
and some of these may resonate better with different audiences.
- Power may be a better entry point for analysis and discussions 
than incentives.
- Don’t discount the value of understanding ideas and what drives 
people.
- The framework in Hudson and Leftwich (2014: pp. 103-109) is one 
starting point, but there are others out there.
2. Operational
- Work on finding “everyday political analysis” tools/processes 
that help to building thinking and working politically into normal 
working practices, particularly at the frontline.
- Be careful not to let these – or political analysis at any level – turn 
into tick-box exercises, as has often happened with PEA.
- Think more about how to get political analysis into strategy 
processes.
3. Evidential
- The DLP will soon publish an analytical framework to help 
build a more systematic evidence base on politically informed 
programming and welcome discussion on how best to take this 
forward in collaboration with other teams.
- Encourage project/programme actors to better build learning on 
“thinking and working politically” into their work and then make 
this publically available for others to learn from. Donors could 
prioritise funding for this as part of design.
- Ensure that claims on what works and what doesn’t are based on 
a “rigorous enough” evidence base.
- Be honest about failures as well as successes (or even cases 
of failure within success). These can be important learning 
opportunities.
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4. Organisational
- Check whether or not there are easy ways for senior managers 
to rethink business practices in order to create space for 
discussions and learning around political analysis.
- Identify potential individual “brokers” within teams who are able 
to encourage and support different ways of working and offer 
support and incentives to help them broker.
- Consider more cross-sector working, but be sure that there are 
members of each team committed to thinking and working 
politically.
Notes
1. Dr David Hudson (University College London) and Dr Heather marquette (University of 
Birmingham) are the directors of the Developmental Leadership Program. We would 
like to thank Brendan Halloran and Tom Parks, in particular, for comments on an earlier 
draft, and Eduardo Gonzalez and Alan Whaites, for their encouragement.
2. There may, however, be some benefits from talking about political analysis as a means 
to address constraints and as a way of managing risk. Particularly in more sensitive 
contexts, where external actors are aware of not (being seen to be) engaging in domestic 
politics, it could be helpful to frame thinking and working politically initially as a way 
of managing constraints and risks.
3. To our knowledge, the most promising implementation of such an approach is the 
Strategy Testing being pioneered by The Asia Foundation. See “Strategy Testing: An 
alternative approach for monitoring flexible and iterative programmes”, Effective 
Development Group website, www.edgroup.com.au/workshop-18-strategy-testing-an-
alternative-approach-for-monitoring-flexible-and-iterative-programs/.
4. As Campbell et al. found when examining what policymakers want in terms of an 
evidence-base, that they need powerful and compelling anecdotes that resonate with 
politicians and the public to persuade and get something on the agenda, but to keep it 
there the evidence-base needs “to be defensible and withstand challenges made to the 
policy decisions. Research that could not stand up to such scrutiny was seen as of little 
use in terms of evidence-based policy” (Campbell et al. 2007: p. 27).
5. See “TWP uptake spectrum”, in the From Poverty to Power blog (3 march 2015), http://
oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/how-can-we-persuade-aid-agencies-to-think-and-work-politically/
twp-uptake-spectrum-2/.
6. These are all challenges from a real-life initiative to co-design a health/governance 
programme.
7. much of the discussion around this reminds us of the famous joke, first summed up by 
Kenneth Boulding in 1970: “There is a story that has been going around about a physicist, 
a chemist and an economist who were stranded on a desert island with no implements 
and a can of food. The physicist and the chemist each devised an ingenious mechanism 
for getting the can open; the economist merely said, ‘Assume we have a can opener’!” 
The PEA world has never been very realistic when it comes to the changes needed to 
take on board this agenda, and it seems to be getting worse rather than better.
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